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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MINE AND THINE: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DRUG
TESTING
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any
given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on
any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time.'
PROLOGUE
It was a Friday evening and I sat down to watch the movie Rush.2 The movie
involved two police officers, who become addicted to heroin while working
undercover to expose the horrors of the drug underworld. It portrayed a tragic view
about drug addiction and law enforcement. During the movie, my feelings vacillated
between anger and despair. Anger, because these officers had taken an oath to serve
and protect the citizens who relied on their agility and attentiveness. Despair,
because these were officers who had succumbed to the same evils that have claimed
so many others in this country. My feelings of despair became even more
pronounced after the recollection of former Washington, D.C. mayor Marion
Barry's use of crack cocaine.3
But there was another aspect to my despair that led me to reflect on the role of
the government in the fight against drug addiction not only in the schools and in the
homes but also in the workplace. In a country infested with drugs, one often
wonders what the role of the government is in the war against drugs.
Is the government's role limited only to educating in our schools and interdicting
at our borders?4 Is it possible to believe realistically that the war on drugs could be
won without more of an active role from the government?
If the answer to the previous questions is that a more active role is needed, then
suppose a state enacts a statute that requires computer operators to be drug tested
randomly because of their unlimited access to personal information. Is this statute
constitutional? What if the statute required all grade and middle school teachers to
be tested randomly because they work with children who are at vulnerable ages? In
an emergency situation, teachers must be able to stay calm, get the students out of
the buildings, respond to the emergency and account for all the children accurately.
Is this statute constitutional? What about judges whose decisions affect the lives of
hundreds of citizens? If on drugs, they may be susceptible to blackmail and
persuasion. Would a statute requiring them to be drug tested be constitutional?
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6 (New American Library ed., 1949). See also Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (stating that George Orwell's "Big Brother" Society has come to life).
2. Rush (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991).
3. See, e.g., Michael York & Steve Twomey, Experts Say Barry's Blood Pressure Dangerously High at
Arrest, WASH. POsT, June 29, 1990, at A23. See also Editorial, Mayor Barry Should Resign, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
1990, at AI 8.
4. This Comment considers the drug testing of both federal and state employees. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, states must comply with the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961).
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I. INTRODUCTION
While many people believe that drug testing should be reserved for those whose
positions involve public safety, the legal criteria determining who may be drug
tested has expanded greatly over the years.5 This Comment is about how the
government has initiated drug testing and how the war on drugs is used to justify
intrusion on employees' privacy interests. The debate about drug testing in the
workplace continues to flourish as more employees are drug tested at different
points in their careers and as states deal with the consequences of legalized medical
marijuana.6
This Comment analyzes various judicial tests used in determining when drug
testing in the public arena might be constitutional.7 Part 11 provides a summary of
the Supreme Court decisions relating to search and seizure and, more specifically,
drug testing. Part III discusses the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures as a challenge to drug testing of public
employees. Part IV explains the balancing test used by the Supreme Court to
determine whether the drug testing programs it examines are constitutional. Part V
discusses the different circumstances under which a public employee may be
subjected to drug testing and the criteria used for determining whether the test is
constitutional. Part VI discusses the implications of the test and attempts to
determine what we can expect next from the Supreme Court. It further attempts to
determine whether an accurate prediction can be made based on the Supreme
Court's analysis of drug testing cases thus far. Finally, this Comment concludes that
the balancing test used by the Supreme Court does not provide adequate guidelines
for an equitable balancing of individual privacy rights, employee rights and the
public interest.
5. See generally Lovvom v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that city's
mandatory urinalysis testing of its firefighters, without reasonable suspicion, violated their rights under the Fourth
Amendment), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839
F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the inception of a drug test is justified only if the employer has
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the employee used controlled substances on the job) rev'd sub nont. Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinburger,
651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (federal police officers cannot be tested without reasonable suspicion).
6. See Drug Watch International (visited June 23, 1998) <httpJ/www.drugwatch.orgJmm.html>
(reporting various articles and findings regarding medical marijuana use); see also <httpJ/www.marijuananews.
com/califomia-.medical-associationt.htm> (discussing a medical marijuana summit called by state Senator John
Vasconcellos, after an order from federal appellate court Judge Charles Breyer prohibited San Francisco Cannabis
Cultivator's Club owner Dennis Peron from selling medical marijuana at his Market Street outlet). According to
San Francisco District Attorney Terence Halliman, 80% of voters in San Francisco approved Proposition 215. In
Arizona, voters passed Proposition 200 which legalizes all drugs such as heroin and LSD to be prescribed for
seriously and terminally ill patients; James Brooke, 5 States Vote Medical Use of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1998, at Al (stating that voters approved initiatives to legalize the medical use of marijuana in Alaska, Arizona,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington State. In Colorado and the District of Columbia, where conservatives managed
to nullify medical marijuana initiatives, surveys of voters indicated strong support for the measures).
7. Drug testing in the private arena is not considered in this Comment because there must be state action
or private employers acting at the direction of the government to invoke the Constitution. See, e.g., United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (stating that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only government action; it is
wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting
as an agent of the government without participation or knowledge of government officials). This Comment does
not consider the constitutional challenges raised by drug testing other than the Fourth Amendment, such as the Fifth
Amendment and the right to be free from self-incrimination, due process of law concerning the accuracy of the
testing, and the privacy rights.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12,564,8 which
prohibits illegal drug use by federal employees, both on and off duty.9 The Order
directs all executive agencies to develop a plan for achieving the objective of a drug
free workplace with due consideration of the rights of the government, the employee
and the public.' 0 The Order also provides that each agency must establish a program
to test the illegal use of drugs by employees in sensitive positions." The extent and
criteria for such testing is to be determined by the head of each agency, based on the
agency's mission, the employees' duties, the efficient use of agency resources, and
the danger to the public health and safety or national security that could result from
the failure of an employee adequately to discharge his position. 2 Drug testing is
authorized: (1) if there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal
drugs; (2)for employees involved in accidents or unsafe practices; or (3) for new job
applicants. 1
3
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of drug testing only
four times in a non-criminal context. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass 'n,"4 the Court held that the Department of Transportation regulations mandating
drug screening of railroad employees after an accident were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment because the safe operation of a railroad is an important
government interest.'5 In its companion case, National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab,16 the Supreme Court held that Customs employees seeking promotions
or transfers to positions involving drug interdiction or the use of a firearm could be
compelled to submit to random drug testing. 7
Since Skinner and Von Raab, the Supreme Court has expanded the boundaries
of when a drug-testing program is constitutional. In Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton,' the Court held that the public school district's student athlete drug policy
program did not violate the student's federal or state constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches. Most recently, in Chandler v. Miller,19 the Court
determined a Georgia statute, that required candidates for elected office be drug
tested within thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and test
negative, to be unconstitutional.20
8. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 226 (stating that the agency head may test any employee who is undergoing, or has undergone,
drug rehabilitation).
14. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
15. See id. at 608.
16. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
17. See id. at 668.
18. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
19. 520U.S. 305.
20. See 520 U.S. at 313 (stating that Georgia's drug testing requirement effects a search is an uncontested
point).
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H. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
makes it the most invoked ground for challenging drug testing of public
employees.2
This Amendment is divided into two clauses. The first establishes the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The second provides that no warrant
shall be issued except for upon probable cause describing the things to be seized.23
It is in the first clause that the two prerequisites needed to invoke Fourth Amend-
ment protection are explained. First, the intrusion must be a "search" or a
"seizure. 24 Second,.the intrusion must be unreasonable.25
Two other tests must be satisfied for Fourth Amendment protection. The Fourth
Amendment only protects against government action26 and the Fourth Amendment
only offers protection to "people., 27 Governmental action includes, but is not
limited to, the action of police officers,28 health and safety inspectors,29 tax law
inspectors, 30 public school officials, 3t public employers conducting urinalysis of
their employees,32 and private employers acting at the direction of government
regulations.33 Thus, government actors may be broadly interpreted.
21. The Fourth Amendment provides:
[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Other possible grounds for challenging drug testing are the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.
22. See U.S. CONST. Amend.IV.
23. See id.
24. See id. Although the Fourth Amendment protects against searches and seizures, there is a distinction
between the two types of intrusions. See Jeffrey S. Pavlovich, Comment, Just Say Yes to Drug-testing Legislation:
The Skinner and Von Raab Decisions, 39 DEPAUL L REV. 161, 165 (1989).
25. See id.
26. Any governmental intrusion resulting in a seizure may also raise a Fifth Amendment cause of action.
See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S 43, 51 (1993) (stating that in order for a
purpose to go beyond the traditional meaning of search and seizure, such action "must comply with the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" as well as with the Fourth Amendment).
27. "People" in this context includes both suspected offenders and law abiding individuals. Corporations
and businesses also have some Fourth Amendment protections. See General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338 (1977).
28. See Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
29. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving city housing
inspectors).
30. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. 338.
31. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (involving the search of a student by school
officials).
32. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (stating that U.S.
Customs Service employers subjecting their employees to drug testing invokes the Fourth Amendment).
33. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding that because the railroad
industry was acting at the direction of federal regulations, the Fourth Amendment was properly raised).
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A. Search and Seizure Cases
The Constitution does not explain what constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has defined a search as an infringement
of a reasonable expectation of privacy,34 and it has stated that a "seizure" of
property occurs when there is a "meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property."35 These definitions of a Fourth Amendment
"search" and "seizure" are applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal
authorities.36
1. Administrative Searches
The Supreme Court delineated the analysis to be applied when determining
whether the government action at issue constitutes a search in Katz v. United
States.37 In Katz, the Court determined that when a government invasion occurs in
a situation where the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, then that
invasion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.3a
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated a two-prong inquiry for determin-
ing whether a person had a legitimate expectation of privacy and thereby had the
right to enjoy Fourth Amendment protections. 39 The first prong of the test is that a
person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.' The second
prong is that the expectation of privacy "be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable'."'4 The Court has adopted this two-prong test in subsequent cases.42
This inquiry has resulted in the standard that there must be a subjective expectation
of privacy before it can be established whether the privacy interest actually exists.43
34. See generally Kenneth Stem, Government Drug Testing and Individual Privacy Rights: Crying Wolf
in the Workplace, 5 YALE L & POL'Y REV. 235, 249 (1986). See U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
35. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1983) (holding that
police seizure of luggage from a suspect's immediate custody on less than probable cause must be within "the
limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person").
36. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (recognizing Fourth Amendment protections
as applicable to city housing inspections). The Court noted that the individual's interest in privacy and personal
security "suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of
other statutory or regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978), it would be
"anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. Id at 353. In Kat7. the government electronically listened to and recorded the defendant's conversation
on a public telephone. Until the Katz decision, every Fourth Amendment claim was based on invasion of private
property. Id. at 351. The Court in Katz held that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id.
39. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring). There is no comparable statement made in the majority opinion.
However, the majority opinion did note that the government's action directed at Katz "violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied." See id. at 353. This can be read as a subjective expectation of privacy.
41. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (deciding first whether the expectation of privacy was
the kind that "society was prepared to recognize as reasonable") (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
43. See New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (stating that determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception; second,
one must determine whether the search actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place).
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But the "reasonableness" prong of the test has come to mean two very different
things. First, whether or not the person desiring privacy has taken steps to attempt
to secure it.' In fact, failure to take steps to secure privacy has proved fatal to the
Fourth Amendment claim. 45 The second meaning is whether the privacy expectation
in the information sought to be concealed or in the area sought to be kept free from
observation is worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. The question is: what
information and what areas does society view as private?46
The Katz decision made a mark on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence47 and
"altered all future applications of fourth amendment rights regarding searches and
seizures.'48 Katz's rule has been identified as the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. 49 However, this rule has been "difficult to apply."50 Thus, it offers
little solution to the problem of what is considered an expectation of privacy and
whether it must be one that is subjective or one that society recognizes as
reasonable.5
The focus of the standard has shifted from an individual's subjective privacy expectation to whether such
subjective expectation is a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525
(stating that the question is whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy is the kind that "society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable") (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concuning)); T.L .a, 489 U.S. at 337 (stating
that the reasonableness as to a specific class of searches requires "balancing the need to search against the invasion
the search entails. On one side of balance are the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security on the other the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order."); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (federal regulations of private railroads requiring railroad
employees to produce urine samples for chemical testing implicate the Fourth Amendment, as those tests invade
expectations of privacy "that society has long recognized as reasonable").
44. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,211 (1986) (stating that one prong of the two-part inquiry
is satisfied when the individual meets the test of "manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
privacy" in the object of the challenged search).
45. See id. at 211-12 (questioning whether a ten-foot fence around a backyard was a sufficient manifestation
of an expectation of privacy from all views of backyard or merely a manifestation of a hope that no one would
observe his backyard).
46. The Court has held that some places, such as open fields and prison cells, do not warrant protection
regardless of the steps taken to prevent invasions of privacy. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984)
(stating that while an intrusion upon a fenced open field is trespass as common law, such governmental intrusion
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, because it does not infringe "upon the personal and
societal value" that society deems private); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524 (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a jail cell due to prison needs and objectives).
47. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 382
(1974).
48. Richard L Aynes, Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or,
A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L REV. 63, 66 (1974). See also Richard S. Walinski & Thomas J. Tucker,
Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 1, 2-4
(1981).
49. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Some have claimed that this designation is somewhat
inaccurate. See Amsterdam, supra note 47, at 383-86.
50. Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV.
133, 135. See also Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 328-29 (1981)
(asserting that the Katz rule is "essentially standardless" and that this could be overcome by a "secrecy and
solitude" analysis being applied to Fourth Amendment "privacy" interests to identify those interests constitutionally
protected); Walinski & Tucker, supra note 48, at 2 ("no principled way for judges to determine whether a given
expectation of privacy" is reasonable).
51. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is essentially a combination of Harlan's two-prong test:
an actual expectation of privacy which is an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. A close
examination of Harlan's two-prong test suggests that the expectation does not have to be reasonable. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). It only has to be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Id.
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Another Supreme Court case that heavily influenced the analysis of searches and
seizures was New Jersey v. T.L.O.,52 in which a public school official searched a
student's purse after learning that she had been smoking in the school's lavatory.
In considering the student's Fourth Amendment challenge to the search by a public
school official, the United States Supreme Court inquired into the reasonableness
of the search by balancing the student's interest in privacy against the school's
interest in maintaining an orderly classroom environment. 53 The Court upheld the
search, reasoning that a teacher's report of the student's smoking made the issue of
whether the student was carrying cigarettes relevant.' This relevancy, the Court
opined, served as a nexus between the search item and the violation under
investigation.55 Finally, the Court held that the search was reasonable in light of the
suspicion provided by the rolling papers found in the student's purse.56
The "special needs" exception was first introduced in Justice Blackmun's T.L.O.
concurrence 57 and took flight from that point. The concurrence by Blackmun stated
that only when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, ' 58 is a court entitled to
change the balancing of interests.59
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,' the Court again found that a search was reasonable, in
spite of the fact that there was no warrant. The reasonable ground in Griffin was a
detective's suggestion that the probationer's home contained firearms. 6' The Court
upheld the search as reasonable on the grounds that there was a special need and
For example: a homeless person who lives in a box in a public park could be considered not to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, if he has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in his box as
a residence and society is prepared to recognize his box as a residence and consequently, recognize his expectation
of privacy as reasonable, this passes Harlan's two-prong test.
52. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, the official also noticed rolling
paper, prompting a more thorough search. See id. at 328. This resulted in the discovery of a small quantity of
marijuana, and paraphernalia which indicated that the student was selling marijuana. See id. The school brought
charges against the student. At the hearing, the student moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the search
violated her Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
53. See id at 339. Justice White also noted the growing disorder in the school rooms, and specifically the
growth of drug use and violent crime in schools. See id.
54. See id. at 345-46. Justice White's majority opinion discounted the need for a search warrant or probable
cause and instead held that the legality of the search was dependent on the reasonableness of the search considering
all the circumstances. See id. at 345-46. Justice White reasoned that a search warrant was unsuited to the school
environment, because requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant would interfere with the disciplinary procedures
needed in schools. See id. He also noted that probable cause was not always a necessary requirement for a
reasonable search. See id.
55. See id. at 345.
56. See id. The Court held that the warrant requirement would unduly interfere with "the maintenance of
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed," and that "strict adherence to the requirement that searches
be based upon probable cause would undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools." Id. Thus establishing the "special needs" exception.
57. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
58. Id. at 341.
59. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). These "special needs" were inherent in the school
setting because maintaining order was often difficult and the need for immediate response to the drug use problem
among the students was required to protect the very safety of the students. See id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment).
60. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
61. See id. In Griffin, a probation officer acting without a warrant searched a probationer's home and
discovered a handgun. The search was conducted pursuant to a state statute that permitted warrantless searches of
a probationer's home if there were "reasonable grounds to believe the presence of contraband." Id. at 871.
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that a warrant requirement would decrease the deterrent effect of expeditious
searches in the state's operation of the probation system.6"
2. Bodily Searches
While the traditional search and seizure cases dealing with property are
numerous, it was not until 1957 that the Court was confronted with a Fourth
Amendment case involving physical exams or bodily searches.63 In Breithaupt v.
Abram,4 the Court examined whether evidence of blood taken from an unconscious
person by a physician in order to determine intoxication was admissible.65 The
Court held that the conduct was not so brutal or offensive that it did not comport
with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.66
Nine years later, the Court in Schmerber v. California67 greatly influenced the
characterization of drug tests as "searches" and "seizures. 68 The Supreme Court
held that a compulsory blood test clearly constitutes a search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.69 However, the Court found, that the search was reasonable and
thus constitutional, even though it was performed without a warrant.7" The Court
based its conclusion on three factors: (1) the delay necessary to obtain a warrant
threatened to destroy the evidence; (2) the test chosen to measure Schmerber's
blood alcohol content was reasonable; and (3) the test was performed in a
reasonable manner.7'
Finally, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,72 the Court held that the
detention of an individual at the border was justified because there was reasonable
suspicion that she was an alimentary canal smuggler.73 In Montoya de Hernandez,
the Court found that although the rectal examination did constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment, it was not unlawful under a balancing of the interests at
62. See id. The Court found that a more stringent probable cause standard would decrease a program's
deterrent effect. See id. at 878.
63. But see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (although the Court held that forcing the accused
to vomit capsules containing morphine was unconstitutional, it addressed the violation under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
64. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
65. See id at 433-34. Breithaupt concerned the criminal prosecution of a man who had been unconscious
while an attending physician withdrew a sample of blood which was shown to contain about 0.17% alcohol. See
id. at 433. The man was charged with manslaughter and the blood was used to convict him.
66. See id. at 435. The Court held that the Constitution did not require, in state prosecutions for state crimes,
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 434.
67. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). For a discussion of the analysis of a search and seizure under the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test
Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. RIL. L. REV. 261 (1993).
68. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766. Schmerber was involved in a car accident and was subsequently
hospitalized for injuries sustained. See id. at 758. At the hospital, he was arrested for drunk driving. See id. A blood
sample was drawn without his consent, for the purpose of determining the alcohol content in his blood. See id. at
759.
69. See id. at 767-68.
70. See id. at 772.
71. See id. at 770-71.
72. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
73. See id. at 541-42.
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stake.74 Further, there was a reasonable, "articulable suspicion of smuggling". 5
Under the circumstances, the detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights
of the traveler.
This was the beginning of the Court's review of cases involving bodily searches
under the Fourth Amendment.76
B. Drug Testing Cases
In the context of drug testing, the chronological occurrence of the "search" and
the "seizure" has been reversed.77 The intrusion might be aptly considered the
seizure phase because the actual search of the contents does not occur until the
specimen is returned from the laboratory. 78 As such, the "seizure" occurs before the
"search." A "seizure"79 is deemed to have occurred when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's "possessory" interest in the individual's property
or person.80 A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society considers
to be reasonable is infringed.8
1. The Skinner Decision
The Supreme Court examined the issue of drug testing in 1989 in companion
cases. 82 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n concerned Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) regulations that required blood and urine tests of all railway
employees involved in train accidents.8 3 The regulations also authorized railroad
companies to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violated certain
safety rules. 4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the post-accident testing as applied
to the railroad employees violated the Fourth Amendment because the tests had no
74. See id. at 539-40.
75. Id. at 544.
76. However, these cases all involved evidentiary issues in criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court cases
teach that even without the warrant requirement, the probable cause standard "is peculiarly related to criminal
investigations." See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 370 n.5 (1976)).
77. In cases involving property, the search occurs before the actual taking of the property. In drug testing
cases, the seizure of the urine or blood occurs first and the search of the composition occurs afterwards. See Jeffrey
S. Pavlovich, Comment, supra note 24 at 165.
78. Id.
79. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Court noted that "[b]ecause it is clear that the
collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy[,] ... these intrusions must be deemed
searches under the Fourth Amendment." 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (footnote omitted).
80. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
81. See id. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing
"expectation of privacy"); New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (stating that in order "[t]o receive the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that society is 'prepared to recognize
as legitimate"') (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984)); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469
(1985) (declaring that "[a] search occurs when 'an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed') (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).
82. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
83. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
84. See id.
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requirement for individualized suspicion. 5 The Ninth Circuit found that the
regulations failed a two-prong reasonableness test: 1) the search must be "justified
at its inception"; and 2) the search as conducted must be "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place". 6 The
circuit court based its holding on the fact that the regulations failed the second
prong of the test. 7 The court found that "blood and urine tests intended to establish
drug use other than alcohol are not reasonably related to the stated purpose of the
tests because the tests cannot measure current drug intoxication or degree of
impairment."88 Thus, the court held that the regulations were unconstitutional. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and upheld the
regulations.' In recognizing that the urinalysis test raised privacy concerns,91 the
Court noted two considerations. First, the regulations reduced the intrusiveness of
the collection process.92 Second, and more importantly, railway employees, "by
reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety," had a diminished expectation of privacy. 93
The Court held that the safety interests warranted the FRA testing program.9' The
Court concluded that the drug tests could deter illegal drug use by railroad
employees who are positioned to "cause great human loss before any signs of
impairment become noticeable to supervisors." 95 The drug-testing program also
informed the railroad industry about the causes of major train accidents.96
Employees could not forecast the timing of an accident or a safety violation or other
events that could trigger testing." The Court explained that the employee's inability
to avoid detection simply by the employees staying drug-free at a prescribed test
time significantly enhanced the deterrent effect of the program.98
85. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1988) rev'd sub no. Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
86. Id. at 587 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).
87. See id.
88. Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
89. See id. at 589.
90. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) rev'g Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1988).
91. The Supreme Court also concluded that drug testing by taking blood and breath samples constitutes a
search. See id. at 616-17. The Skinner Court added that
[t]aking a blood or urine sample might also be characterized as a Fourth Amendment seizure,
since it may be viewed as a meaningful interference with the employee's possessory interest in
his bodily fluids. It is not necessary to our analysis in this case, however, to characterize the
taking of blood or urine samples as a seizure of those bodily fluids, for the privacy expectations
protected by this characterization are adequately taken into account by our conclusion that such
intrusions are searches.
Id. at 617-18 n.4 (citation omitted).
92. See id. at 626.
93. Id. at 627.
94. See id. at 628-30.
95. Id. at 628.
96. See id. at 650.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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2. The Von Raab Decision
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,99 the issue involved a
program that made drug tests a condition of promotion or transfer to positions
directly involving drug interdiction or requiring the employee to carry a firearm, or
involving access to classified information."°° The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Court found that the justification for initiating the testing was reasonable."'1 Further,
the Fifth Circuit recognized that since the purpose of the search was administrative
rather than criminal, the need for protection against government intrusion was
minimal.0 2
The Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Customs service program stating that the
service's program was not prompted by a demonstrated drug abuse problem.0 3
However, the Court found that the agency had an "almost unique mission, ' ' °4 as the
first obstacle against the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States. 05 The
Court held that the government had a compelling interest in assuring that employees
in positions, which involve large amounts of illegal narcotics and interaction with
criminals, would not themselves be drug users."° Individualized suspicion would
not work in such a setting because it was not feasible to subject these employees
and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in
traditional office environments.'0 7
3. The Vernonia Decision
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,' °8 the Court vacated and remanded the
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held a random drug-testing
program for high school students engaged in interscholastic athletic competitions
unconstitutional."'9 The Supreme Court concluded that the program's context was
very significant because local governments bear large "responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."" 0 It
was an "immediate crisis" caused by "a sharp increase in drug use" in the school
district"' that sparked the program. The District Court found that the student
athletes were not only "among the drug users""' 2 but that they were also the "leaders
99. 816 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1987), affid in part and vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
100. See Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 173.
101. See id. at 179.
102. See id.
103. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989), aff'g in part and
vacating in part 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 674.
105. See id. at 668.
106. See id. at 670.
107. See id. at 674.
108. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). For a more thorough analysis of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, see Darrel
Jackson, Note and Comment, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students' Fourth Amendment Rights?
28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673 (1996); Blake W. Martell, Note, Hitting the Mark: Vemonia School District v. Acton, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 223 (1996); Eric N. Miller, Comment, Suspicionless Drug-testing of High School and College
Athletes after Acton: Similarities and Differences, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 361 (1996).
109. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648, 666.
110. Id. at665.
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at649.
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of the drug culture."'"13 The Court noted in its decision that "students within the
school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally.""..4 The Court emphasized the importance of deterring drug
use among children and the risk of injury a student athlete poses on himself and
those engaged with him on the playing field."'
A significant portion of the Vernonia decision rested on the fact that the students
had a limited expectation of privacy both as students and as athletes. As students,
they were subject to a "degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults"'"16 and as athletes, they had "voluntarily subject[ed] themselves to
a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.""'
Thus, the Court was very cautious against applying the presumption that all
suspicionless testing would pass constitutional muster in other contexts.' 8
4. The Chandler Decision
More recently, however, in Chandler v. Miller,"9 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute which required that all candidates for
designated state offices certify that they have taken a urinalysis drug test within 30
days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the test result was
negative. 20 The Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's precedents
sustaining drug-testing programs for student athletes, customs employees, and
railroad employees in Vernonia,121 Von Raab122 and Skinner,'23 and judged
Georgia's law constitutional. 24 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding
that Georgia's requirement that candidates for sate office pass a drug test "does not
fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches.' 25
The Court found that Georgia failed to show a special need that was substantial
enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest. 26 It continued
by remarking that a demonstrated problem of drug abuse is not always necessary to
validate a testing program. 27 However, the Court stated that if there were a showing
of unlawful drug use, it would support the assertion of a "special need" for a
suspicionless general search program. 28 The Court used Skinner and Vernonia to
113. Id.
114. Id. at 656-57 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
115. See id. at 661-62.
116. Id. at 655.
117. Id. at657.
118. See id.
119. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
120. See 520 U.S. at 309.
121. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).
122. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 658-59 (1989).
123. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 608-13 (1989).
124. See Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
125. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309.
126. See 520 U.S. at 318. "Proof of unlawful drug use may help to clarify-and substantiate-the precise
hazards posed by such use." Id. at 319.
127. See id. at 319 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673-75).
128. See id.
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help bolster the reasoning that public safety was not genuinely in jeopardy and that
the Georgia statute diminished personal privacy for mere symbolic sake. 129
IV. REASONABLENESS AND THE BALANCING TEST
Generally, the primary drug testing procedure used by the government involves
urinalysis.' 3 Once it is determined that urinalysis falls under the search and seizure
analysis of the Fourth Amendment, the inquiry into the constitutionality of the
testing begins. 3 ' The reason for this is that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid
all searches and seizures by the state.'32 The Constitution only prohibits those
searches and seizures that are unreasonable. 33 Thus, constitutional requirements of
reasonableness must be applied to the issue of public employee drug-testing.
As the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate and defining measure of the
constitutionality of a search is "reasonableness.' ' 34 What is reasonable depends on
"all of the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure and the nature of the
search or seizure itself."'' 35 Thus, the permissibility of an employee drug test must
be "judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' 36
Finding that a search occurred begins the inquiry into whether there has been a
Fourth Amendment violation. The general rule is that warrantless searches, such as
the urinalysis testing discussed in this Comment, are unreasonable and therefore
violate the Fourth Amendment. 37 However, the general rule is not absolute and
clearly delineated exceptions have been forged. 13
The exceptions allow the state to prove the reasonableness of the search or
seizure without showing probable cause or obtaining a warrant. 139 Instead, in order
to determine the reasonableness of the search, courts have articulated a balancing
test where the invasion of privacy rights are weighed against the governmental
interests in the search. 4 ° The balancing test also involves weighing the necessity of
129. See id. at 321-22.
130. However, drug use can also be detected through blood and hair analysis. See Michael Isikoff, Splitting
Hairs to Find the Roots of Drug Use, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1990, at A15 (use of mass spectrometer to detect drugs
in hair samples expands from law enforcement to private industry).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
132. See id. See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
134. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646.
135. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)
(internal quotations omitted)).
136. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
137. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
138. For examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(finding that a warrantless search of a probationer's home was valid because special needs made warrant
requirement impracticable); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (discussing administrative searches of
closely regulated industries); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (addressing border
searches); New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (finding that the requirement of a warrant in the search of
a student was reasonable); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (addressing inventory searches); Carroll v.
Unites States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (addressing the "automobile exception").
139. See T.L0., 469 U.S. at 340; Burger, 482 U.S. at 701-03.
140. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (addressing government searches to retrieve work-
related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules).
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a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. 4 '
In applying this balancing test, courts generally consider four main factors: (1) the
scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is conducted; (3) the
justification for initiating it; and (4) the place in which it is conducted.142 These can
also be characterized as: (1) the nature of the intrusion; (2) the character of the
intrusion; and (3) governmental interest involved. 43 It is because of the melange of
the factors that the reasonableness question and the balancing test have become a
case-by-case analysis.' 44
A. The Nature of the Intrusion
There are a number of factors. to consider when examining the nature of the
intrusion of drug testing. These factors tend to permit drug testing when the testing
is conducted under less intrusive circumstances. 45 Among them is prior notice. 46
This is how long in advance does the employee know of the planned drug test. This
was brought up by the Court in Von Raab because if an employee knows in advance
then s/he may avoid using drugs in order to receive the right result. 47 Another factor
is the limited discretion in choosing the tested employee. 48 The reasoning behind
this is that if the employee is chosen in a way which is not random but is actually
triggered by either some activity of the employee or some perceived activity, then
the employee has some hand in being chosen for the drug test. Finally, another
factor is the particular employment context.4 9 If the position is one which involves
the safety of the public then it is often presumed that the safety of the public
outweighs the interest of the employee.
B. The Character of the Intrusion
The character of the intrusion caused by urinalysis must be analyzed in terms of
both the "physical" nature of the intrusion as well as its "personal" nature.15° The
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals from
unreasonable government searches.'15 Obtaining and examining physical evidence,
141. See id. at719-20
142. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
143. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (in analyzing the drug testing
program, the court considered the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion that is complained
of and the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern).
144. See id. See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177-80 (5th Cir.
1987), affd in part, vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). The court suggested a list of determinative factors to
determine the intrusiveness of the test which included: 1) the scope and manner of the test; 2) the justification for
the test; 3) the location of the test; 4) voluntary nature considerations; 5) the existing employment relationship; 6)
the possible administrative nature of a search; 7) the availability of less intrusive measures; and 8) the effectiveness
of the administered test.
145. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671.
146. See id. at 672-73 n.2.
147. See id.
148. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
149. See id. at 627-28; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
150. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,652 (1995).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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as in a urinalysis, from a person constitutes a search if doing so infringes the
person's expectation of privacy.'52
With respect to drug testing, courts have recognized two varieties of
'intrusion' ." The first variety is common to all kinds of searches: the humiliation
of exposing oneself."M This intrusion might aptly be called the 'seizure phase', since
the actual search does not occur until the specimen is returned to the laboratory.
Requiring some level of suspicion before forcing someone to urinate at the
command of a tester reasonably limits the number of the seizure-phase intrusions.
The second intrusion is that of revealing the secrets locked in the chemical
makeup of one's urine - the actual "search phase.""' A urine sample may reveal
medical disorders including epilepsy and diabetes. 5 6 Most employers have no
legitimate interest in such information, nor do they have a permissible interest in
any indications of drug use not affecting the employees' job performance.
The Supreme Court has held that a compelled intrusion into the body, for blood
to be analyzed for alcohol content, is a Fourth Amendment search. 57 This stems
from society's concern for the security of one's person. 5 Any physical intrusion
that penetrates beneath the skin infringes on one's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 5 9 The chemical analysis of the sample obtained in order to discover
physiological data, is a further intrusion on the tested individual's privacy
interest. 160
Therefore, it is necessary to examine urinalysis with respect to the individual's
expectation of privacy. A court must ask whether the individual has "exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy" before an intrusion by urinalysis is made.' 6'
Courts have held that an individual can reasonably expect to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment from bodily intrusions such as the taking of blood, 62 nails,
163
and hair.)" The individual, subject to urinalysis, should also be protected under the
Fourth Amendment under the same analysis as that applied to the taking of one's
152. See Cupp v Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
153. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. 602,617 (stating that it is not disputed "that chemical analysis of urine
... can reveal a host of private medical facts ... [n]or can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample
to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates
privacy interests.").
154. See John A. Scanlan, Jr., Playing the Drug Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institution and
the Structures of ConstitutionalArgument, 62 IND. L J. 863, 666 (1987) (urinalysis has the potential for inflicting
humiliation and virtually limitless information about the person being tested); see also Note, Search and Seizure
in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 701 (1961) (discussing the
humiliation and mental suffering caused by searches in the criminal context).
155. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 614-17.
156. See McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), affd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987). See also Jeannette C. James, Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Employee Drug Testing:
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U. L REV. 109, 116 n.2 (1988).
157. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (citing Schxnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753 (1985) (internal citations omitted)).
158. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
159. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
160. Id.
161. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
162. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.
163. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
164. See Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977).
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blood, nails and hair.'65 Although passing urine is not and cannot be considered an
invasive procedure, it does involve the act of urination, which is recognized as a
private body function." There is a great expectation of privacy in an individual's
urine because modem technology has made it possible for laboratory tests to reveal
personal information about an individual's medical history including venereal
diseases and pregnancy.'67 Thus, because of the search involved, urinalysis falls
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 6
However, although urinalysis intrudes upon an "excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy,"'169 the degree of physical "intrusion depends on the
manner in which the urine produced was monitored."'7 Thus, a drug-testing policy
that requires a person to be observed by a monitor or that discloses more informa-
tion than simply the presence or absence of illicit drugs may affect the intrusiveness
of the policy and consequently, its reasonableness. However, this factor is generally
not considered significant enough to prevent a drug testing policy that meets the
other factors.' 7 '
C. The Governmental Interest
The final factor in determining the constitutionality of a search and search
through urinalysis is the nature and the immediacy of the government's interest72
and the effectiveness of the policy behind the intrusion."' In order for the state to
lawfully intrude upon a constitutional right, the governmental interest usually must
be compelling. 74 However, six years after the Court found that a compelling
interest was required by the state to effectuate a constitutional search, the Court
165. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 604, 616-17 (the court noted that excretory functions are traditionally shielded
by great privacy).
166. See id. at 617. "There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine .... It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
167. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 604, 617. See also Paul R. Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public
Sector Work Place Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 605, 621 & n.59 (1987).
168. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See generally Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
172. When courts have weighed the balancing interests, the governmental interests generally fall into three
categories. The first is integrity. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (stating that government has a compelling interest
in ensuring that the frontline interdiction personnel has unimpeachable integrity); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
318 (asserting that statute is justified because the use of illegal drugs draws into an official's integrity). But see Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia J., dissenting) (characterizing integrity claim as nothing more than a "symbolic
opposition to drug use"); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that a generalized interest in
the integrity of the workplace is not enough to overcome the privacy interests at issue).
The second governmental interest is the protection of sensitive information. See generally Willner v.
Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1020 (1991).
The third and perhaps the most significant governmental interest is public safety. See Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 664; Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Michael Mass, Public Sector Drug
Testing: A Balancing Approach And The Search For A New Equilibrium, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 231, 249 (1990).
173. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
174. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (holding that compelling state interest precipitating the search was to
prevent railway accidents); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (finding that the compelling state interest was to ensure the
fitness of customs officials in the interdiction of drugs and in the handling of firearms).
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noted that it was a mistake to characterize the term "compelling state interest," as
applied in the Fourth Amendment context, as a "fixed minimum quantum of
governmental concern.""' But the primary issue is whether there is a state interest
here and whether it needs to be compelling. 76
Thus, the governmental interest does not have to be a compelling or substantial
one. Rather, the government interest need only be one that appears to be important
enough to justify the particular search at hand and which, in light of other factors,
shows the search to be relatively unintrusive on a genuine expectation of privacy. 177
D. The Warrant Requirement and the "Special Needs" Exception
Even though the first part of the Fourth Amendment test is met, the court still has
to contend with the warrant requirement.77 The warrant requirement mandates that
the government obtain a warrant before conducting a search. However, as a result
of the case-by-case analysis, a significant exception to the warrant requirement has
developed. This exception is the "special needs" exception,79 which recognizes that
special needs often exist, which make a warrant requirement or a probable cause
requirement impracticable.' g In recognizing this impracticability, courts have
waived the Fourth Amendment warrant or probable cause requirements in public
employee drug-testing cases, and instead apply a balancing test to determine a
search's reasonableness.' 81
"Special needs" are those needs, which are "beyond normal law enforcement that
may justify [a] departure[] from the usual warrant and probable-cause require-
ments."'2 "Normal" needs presumably refer to those searches conducted by the
police for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal prosecution. 3 To escape
the standard applied in cases of "normal" needs, a "special need" must have some
distinct or unique quality. A "special need" refers to a need that is purportedly even
greater than the normal needs of law enforcement.' This "special need" exception
was demonstrated in the concurring opinion of New Jersey v. T.L 0.85
175. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660.
176. The "phrase [compelling state interest] describes an interest which appears important enough to justify
the particular search at hand, in fight of other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy." Id.
177. See id. See also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987) vacated and renanded sub
nom Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989), 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (focusing only on drug testing in
the context of a regular medical examination for employment purposes).
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
179. For a more thorough analysis of the "special needs" exception, see Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, "Special
Needs" And The Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised To Swallow The Warrant Preference Rule, 32
HARv.C.R.-C.L L REv. 529 (1997).
180. New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
181. See id. at n.27.
182. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,620 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)). See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(discussing special need for work related searches of employees' desks and offices); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337-42
(addressing the special need for search of students proper by school officials).
183. See Buffaloe, supra note 179, at 529.
184. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
185. 469 U.S. 325.
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In considering the student's Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court in T.L.O.
balanced the student's interest in privacy and the school's interest in maintaining
an orderly classroom environment." 6 In applying this balancing test, Justice White
eliminated the need for a search warrant..7 or probable cause. 8 Instead, he held that
the legality of the search was a question of whether it was reasonable considering
all the circumstances. 189
The "special needs" exception was further demonstrated regarding probationers
in Griffin v. Wisconsin as previously discussed." The special needs exception was
extended to employment cases soon after the Griffin case because of the risks
involved with drug abuse in the workplace. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, the special need was to ensure safety on the railroads. 9' National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab involved the "substantial interests"' 92 to deter drug
use among those employees charged with protecting the borders from the flow of
drugs. "'93 Prior to the Skinner and Von Raab decisions, all "special needs" involved
either an element of individualized suspicion or realized harm which was mitigated
by the search. 94 The Supreme Court decisions in Skinner and Von Raab established
that the designation of a "special need" or.a safety sensitive position was necessary
for establishing whether the interest of the government is substantial enough to
override an individual's privacy interest."5
-As indicated above, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
is often the determinative factor in assessing whether a drug testing program is
constitutional. This prevents the issues in a drug testing program from being
arranged easily within pre-set rules. Instead, courts apply various balancing tests
and view the totality of the circumstances. Because the balancing tests analyze
different positions and different interests, the results of the tests are often not
consistent.
V. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH EMPLOYEES ARE TESTED
There are six common circumstances under which an employee might be subject
to drug testing. 6 These are listed from the least intrusive means of drug testing to
the most intrusive. Intrusiveness is based on several factors from the manner in
186. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340. Justice White also noted the growing disorder in the school rooms, and
specifically the growth of drug use and violent crime in schools. See id. at 339.
187. See id. at 340. The Court reasoned that a search warrant was unsuited to the school environment,
because requiring a teacher to obtain a search warrant would unduly interfere with swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in schools. See id
188. See id. Justice White noted that probable cause was not always a necessary requirement for a reasonable
search. See id.
189. See id. at341.
190. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). See supra Part m.A.l, nn.60-62 and accompanying text.
191. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
192. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
193. Id.
194. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 330 (where the student had been searched because she had been caught
smoking); see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (where a detective had declared his suspicion that the probationer's
home contained contraband).
195. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
196. See 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
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which the employee is chosen to the amount of notice given to the employee.' 97
There are also distinctions drawn between the timing of the tests (e.g. pre-
employment, periodic, return-to-duty) and the basis of the tests (e.g. random,
reasonable suspicion, post-accident).
A. Pre-employment Drug Testing
This type of testing is perhaps the most common and the least objectionable form
of drug testing.' 9 The employer's interest in testing an applicant is different from
testing an incumbent employee because an applicant cannot be evaluated on work
performance. Thus, the employer must review the applicant's entire background to
determine if the applicant will be a good employee.' 99 Because evidence of drug
abuse raises legitimate concerns about safety and productivity, it must be part of the
hiring criteria. Thus, the employer may make the job offer conditional on the result
of a drug test.
Pre-employment testing often does not involve the same type of analysis as the
other types of testing because the applicant has not yet been hired and as such does
not have the same level of privacy interests or expectations that an employee has.'
The privacy expectation of people seeking certain positions is significantly reduced
relative to other members of society. 0 t Those who voluntarily choose to accept a
job that requires testing do not encounter the same level of intrusion on privacy.20 2
The test is triggered by the job applicant's voluntary conduct and generally occurs
only one time during the applicant's career.20 3 The applicant is also presumably on
notice and might choose not to go forward with the application and drug test.'
197. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671 (citing several factors used in determining the intrusiveness of a drug
test).
198. See Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir 1991); Doe v. City of Honolulu, 816 P.2d 306
(Haw. 1991); City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 565 A.2d 672 (Md. 1989); Middlebrooks
v. Wayne County, 521 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1994); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430 (N.J.
1987). See also McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (stating that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment, however, does not preclude taking a body fluid specimen as part of a pre-employment physical
examination or as part of any routine periodic physical examination that may be required of employees").
199. See Willner, 928 F.2d at 1192 (stating that the hiring process, particularly the interviews and the
background investigation, is designed to gather information so that a judgment may be made regarding the
applicant's suitability for employment).
200. See id. "If the reasonable privacy expectations of applicants are less than those of the employees and
if the testing procedure for applicants is itself unintrusive, the government is not required to demonstrate as high
a degree of justification as it must to conduct random testing of those already employed." Id. at 1188.
201. See generally International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Dep't of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that applicants have a reduced expectation of privacy); Willner, 928 F.2d 1185 (applicant's
knowledge of what will be required, and when, affects the strength of his or her interest).
202. See Willner, 928 F.2d at 1190 (finding that no one is compelled to seek a job and if individuals view
drug testing as offensive, they need only refrain from applying).
203. This is unless the position is a safety-sensitive one.
204. "[T]here is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants." Henry
J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975).
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To determine whether a pre-employment test is constitutional, 0 5 the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Skinner,2' Von Raab 7 and Chandler v. Miller"8 is the best
place to begin. Appellate courts have generally required the presence of a public
safety concern to find a pre-employment drug-testing program reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.' 9 Therefore, merely submitting an application is not sufficient
to satisfy the reasonableness test.U° However, the applicant's status as a non-
employee certainly lessens their privacy rights21' and under Von Raab and Skinner,
the government's burden in defending an applicant's challenge to a drug test is
minimal.212
Regarding this type of testing, courts generally base their decisions on the
applicant's reduced expectation of privacy.2"3 Willner v. Thornburgh214 presents an
excellent example of a reduced right to privacy of a job applicant. In Willner, a
federal circuit court was confronted with the issue of whether the government could
subject an applicant to a pre-employment urinalysis drug test in connection with his
application for a position as an attorney with the Department of Justice.215 In
determining whether the testing was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the
court focused on the applicant's reduced expectation of privacy. 216 The court also
found that the applicant's privacy expectation was significantly diminished when
the applicant submitted to a complete and thorough background investigation.2" 7
Additionally, the court noted that the applicant had been provided with adequate
notice of the testing.218
In Von Raab, the employees who were subjected to the drug test were those
seeking a promotion or transfer.2 19 Under the Customs program, all employees who
sought these positions knew that they had to take a drug test and were likely aware
of the procedures the Service must follow in administering the test.220 Further, the
process becomes automatic when the employee elects to apply for, and thereafter
205. For a general analysis of preemployment drug testing, see Stefan Jan Marculewicz, Some Tough
Questions for Challenges to Preemployment Drug-testing, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243 (1993).
206. 489 U.S. 602.
207. 489 U.S. 656.
208. 520 U.S. 305.
209. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (striking as
unconstitutional a Georgia law that required all applicants for state employment to submit to and pass a drug test).
See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1307 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Department of Transportation has a sufficient interest in protecting public safety on the highways to require
pre-employment testing of truck drivers).
210. Several courts have held that a mere interest in the integrity of the workplace is not good enough to
require an individual to submit to a drug test. See Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Georgia
Ass'n of Educators, 749 F. Supp. at 1115.
211. Transportation Indus. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 655 (D.D.C. 1989).
212. See Lois Yurow, Note, Alternative Challenges to Drug-testing of Government Employees: Options After
Von Raab and Skinner, 58 GEO. WASH. L REv. 148, 149 (1989).
213. See Willner v. Thomburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1186-87.
216. Id. at 1189-90.
217. Id. at 1189.
218. But cf. Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (blanket testing of
applicants for all state jobs unconstitutional).
219. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
220. Seeid. at670-71.
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pursue, the position. 22' The employees were essentially self-selected,222 the tests
were not conducted by surprise 322 ' and the taking and analysis of the urine sample
was limited in many respects.224 The employees were not tested again.225 This is
essentially a pre-employment process 226 yet, the Court analyzed the testing policy
as one involving a "safety sensitive" or "special needs" exception.227 Nevertheless,
the court implicitly modified its holding of Von Raab in Chandler v. Miller.228
In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute which
required all candidates to submit to and pass a drug test was unconstitutional.229 The
Court held that in order for a drug testing program to be upheld in a situation where
there is no safety sensitive position, a "special need" had to be shown.230 The
"special need" had to be substantial enough to override an individual's acknowl-
edged privacy interest.23
Although Chandler was not a pre-employment case,232 it involves essentially the
same issues.233 The statute in Chandler required that the test be taken before
nomination or election.2'" The test revealed only the presence or absence of illegal
drugs .235 The results are not made available to law enforcement officers in the event
that a candidate chooses not to file them.236
However, the consequence of Chandler is that now the government has to show
that there is some special need before it subjects the applicant to a drug test.237 In
Skinner and Von Raab, the standards for applicants were easy for the government
to meet. Chandler has made it more difficult for a government to succeed against
a claim of unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment in the
context of drug testing. Thus, Chandler modified Willner, to the extent that Willner
required applicants to be subjected to drug testing irrespective of the fact that the
position was not safety sensitive.
221. See id. at 667.
222. See id. at 670.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 670-71.
225. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
226. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
advance notice of the employer's condition may be taken into account as one of the factors relevant to the extent
of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy).
227. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-71.
228. See Nathan A. Brown, Reining in the National Drug Testing Epidemic, Chandler v. Miller, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L REV. 253, 261 (1998).
229. See Chandler, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09.
230. See 520 U.S. at 321-22.
231. See520U.S.at318.
232. The drug-testing requirement in Chandler does not fall into any of the circumstances set out in this
Comment. The facts and the requirements of the program in Chandler indicate that it would fit best in the category
of pre-employment testing.
233. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320 (respondents stating that court should rely on the decision in Von Raab
where the court sustained a drug-testing program for officers seeking a promotion or transfer).
234. See id. at 309.
235. See id. at312.
236. See id.
237. In the alternative, the government may show that there is a "safety sensitive" position involved.
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B. Post-accident Drug Testing
Post-accident testing occurs when the employee is tested after an accident or
some other safety violation.23 It is likely that Skinner insulated most post-accident
testing from Fourth Amendment attack because it gives much latitude to
employers.239 In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that drug testing after an accident
was reasonable because the invasion of privacy was minimalY' ° Often, post-accident
testing involves employees whose positions concern issues of a sensitive nature,
such as bus drivers 41 or railroad employees.242 Thus, the sensitive nature of the
employees' duties may justify the testing without individualized suspicion.243
The most important basis for post-accident testing, which allows for a lower
expectation of privacy, is the protection of public safety.2' The Skinner Court
stressed that post accident procedures are intended to provide valuable information
that can help to pinpoint the cause of an accident, and to deter drug use "[b]y
ensuring that employees... know that they will be tested upon the occurrence of
a triggering event, the timing of which no employee can predict with certainty. 245
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy argued that requiring supervisors to
establish the existence of individualized suspicion in the aftermath of an accident
would defeat the government's compelling interests in public safety, investigating
the causes of accidents, and deterring drug use among covered employees.246 The
scene at a serious accident is typically confused and chaotic, and investigators often
find it very difficult to determine which employees may have contributed to the
accident. 247 The delay caused by the need to identify suspected employees and
gather sufficient evidence to support the existence of individualized suspicion
would likely result in the "loss or deterioration of the evidence provided by the
tests.""24 Consequently, the important governmental interests served by the post-
accident testing regulations would be seriously hindered if supervisors were forced
to gather specific facts amounting to an individualized suspicion of impairment
238. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607-11 (1989).
239. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602, 608-09 (stating that the regulations do not restrict a railroad's
authority to absolutely prohibit the presence of alcohol and drugs in the body fluids of an employee and that the
post-accident toxicological testing is mandatory).
240. See id. at 628.
241. See Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475 (6th Cir 1991).
242. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608-10 (commenting that to the extent transportation and like restrictions are
necessary to procure the requisite samples for testing, this interference alone is minimal given the employment
context in which it takes place); see also Cronin v. FAA, 73 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11 th Cir. 1988) (vacating on public policy grounds an arbitration
award reinstating pilot who was discharged after narcotics detection dogs found marijuana butts in his car and he
tested positive for marijuana use). See generally Carroll E. Dubec & Jacqueline Fitgerald Brown, Drug Testing In
Aviation: The Double Standard Continues, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 43 (1992) (exploring drug testing in aviation as
promulgated by the Omnibus Transportation Employee Training Act, the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration); Lisa A. Wilcox, Note, Random Drug Testing in the Aviation Industry, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 559 (1992) (suggesting that the stricter and more traditional approach of the Fourth Amendment analysis
should be used in aviation cases).
243. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-07, 610.
244. See id. at 639-40
245. Id. at 630.
246. See id. at 632.
247. See id. at 631.
248. Id.
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before testing a particular employee. This led inexorably to the majority's
conclusion.249
The balancing test in this type of testing would involve weighing the employer's
interest in determining whether drugs contributed to the cause of the accident and
initiating a resolution of a problem against the employee's privacy interest.
C. Routine Drug Testing
Routine drug testing generally involves tests taken as part of a medical
examination with minimal intrusion on the employee's privacy interest. Routine
testing250 is usually upheld against a constitutional challenge.251 One reason that
drug testing during routine scheduled physicals is less objectionable than other tests
is that employees have a lower expectation of privacy as to such testing. Thus, this
is only minimally intrusive.252 Moreover, because urine specimens are normally
requested in medical examinations for reasons other than to detect illicit drug use,
one can argue than an analysis for the presence of drugs can be conducted with no
additional physical intrusion.253 Moreover, urinalysis testing in these situations is
further supported by the fact that regularly scheduled medical examinations do not
foster the same type of anxiety as do random, unscheduled exams.
One of the major factors that reduce the privacy expectation and the intrusiveness
of the drug test 55 is that in a routine drug test, employees have notice far in
advance.2 56 Notice in a routine drug test can be met in different ways. In Skinner,
accidents and rule violations triggered notice of the testing." In Von Raab, testing
249. See id. at 633-34.
250. This is also known as "periodic" testing.
251. See generally Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) vacated and remanded for
further consideration sub nom Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989) (upholding routine examination of school
bus attendant).
252. See Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 340; see also Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria City Transit
Authority, 691 F. Supp. 898, 902 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (no Fourth Amendment violation in a transit authority's policy
of drug-testing bus drivers and mechanics during annual physical exams); McKendall v. New Orleans, 1993 WL
85954 (E.D. La 1993) (unreported opinion).
253. However, in that particular instance the process involved is one of a search not the seizure of the
specimen. In this circumstance, the urine sample is already "seized" thus it is the search aspect which is at issue
here.
Giving a urine sample is part of an ordinary physical examination and, whatever interest in "physiological
secrets" in already-discharged urine there may be testing for the presence of certain drugs is a minimal intrusion.
See Wrightshell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
254. See Wrightshell, 678 F. Supp. at 733 (stating that there is a reasonable ground for desiring to test the
fitness of a public safety employee and since the medical examinations are only conducted under specified
circumstances, the likeliness of abuse or harassment is reduced and intrusion is minimized by limiting the
mandatory examinations to specific circumstances).
255. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672-73 n.2 (1989). See also
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1302 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that notice
that one will be subject to testing on the job reduces the element of surprise and diminishes the expectation of
privacy).
256. See City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 4000,565 A.2d 672, 678 (Md.
1989) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1987)). See also International Fed'n of Prof'l & Technical Eng'rs,
Local 1944 v. Burlington County Bridge Comm., 572 A.2d 204, 208 (N.J. 1990) (explaining that drug-testing
during a routine physical is less intrusive than other drug-testing).
Another reason for lower privacy expectation and reduces intrusiveness is the fact that taking a urine sample
for a purely medical examination is generally not monitored.
257. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 672-73.
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was required only for employees who sought transfer or promotions to certain
sensitive positions and the employees were notified in advance of the scheduled
sample collection.258 In both these cases, the employees knew in advance when the
testing could take place even if it did not occur in a physical examination. This
knowledge means that "the amount of anxiety should not be substantial" and thus,
the level of privacy intrusion is less severe.259 The Supreme Court also acknowl-
edged the importance of notice in the Fourth Amendment calculus in Von Raab,
where it identified advance notice as a factor that minimized the testing programs
intrusion on privacy." °
Courts are more likely to approve of routine testing over other drug testing
because routine testing does not infringe on employee privacy interests as much as
unexpected testing. However, in Chandler, the court asserted that "Georgia's
singular drug test for candidates is not part of a medical examination designed to
provide certification of a candidate's general health, and we express no opinion on
such examinations. 26'
However, as Chief.Justice Rehnquist sarcastically expressed
[I]t is all but inconceivable that a case involving [questions of medical examina-
tions] could be decided differently than the present case.... The only possible
basis for distinction is to say that the State has a far greater interest in the
candidate's "general health" than it does with respect to his propensity to use
illegal drugs."262
Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, any routine drug test would be
permissible if it is in connection with a routine physical examination. Further,
Chandler appears to be narrower than the holding in Von Raab regarding the
analysis of the duties of the tested class, the presence or absence of a past history
of drug use, and the deterrent role of the drug testing scheme. If the Chandler. Court
had accepted the rationale in Von Raab of the deterrent rationale, it would still be
considered a legitimate justification for a suspicionless search. But the Chandler
Court rejected the deterrence rationale as a justification, rendering the analysis of
routine drug testing unclear. What is indisputable is that Chandler does not shield
routine drug testing programs from attacks.
Nevertheless, under a routine test, because the intrusion is so minimal and the
government interest is only required to be important (rather than compelling), the
test of constitutionality is usually met.263 Thus, the search may still be reasonable
258. See id.
259. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1303.
260. See Von Raab, 489 at 672 n.2.
261. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
262. Id. at 327-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (stating that the proffered special need for drug testing must be
substantial--important enough to override the individual's privacy interest); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding that in limited circumstances where privacy interests are minimal and where
important governmental interests furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by requiring suspicion,
a search could be reasonable); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that it is not unreasonable
to drug test as part of a routine medical examination when there is a clear nexus between the tests and the
employers' legitimate safety concerns) vacated and remandedforfurther consideration sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones,
490 U.S. 1001 (1989), 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the program had a close and substantial relation
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in spite of the absence of any suspicion of drug use.
D. Return-to-Duty Drug Testing
This circumstance occurs when the employee has either tested positive in the
past, has admitted to drug use, or sometimes has simply refused to test and is
dismissed.2" Thereafter, the person is tested either randomly or periodically.265
Return-to-duty testing is usually authorized if the employee has completed a drug
rehabilitation program and the medical review officer approves his return to
work.266 Many government agencies provide those employees experiencing drug
problems with Employee Assistance Programs (EAP).2 67 These programs offer
therapy, rehabilitation and counseling.268 The employee may become a part of the
program on a mandatory or voluntary basis.29 The voluntary participation generally
allows the employee to maintain a good employment relationship with the company.
Return-to-duty testing is rarely challenged27 and as a result, there are few cases
that address it.271 This may be because employees subjected to return-to-duty testing
have a diminished expectation of privacy because they often have already tested
positive for drug use.272 The employer actually does the employee a favor by
continuing to keep the employee with the company.273
E. Reasonable Suspicion Drug Testing
Of all the standards of drug testing, perhaps the most straightforward is the
reasonable suspicion testing.274 An employer can subject employees to drug testing
to the government's interest).
264. See 3 C.F.R. 224, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
265. See id.
266. See Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir 1989) (citing to 53 Fed. Reg. 47,024, 47,058 (1988)).
267. See 3 C.F.R. 224, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994) (authorizing drug testing as part of an employee's
counseling or rehabilitation for drug use through an employee assistance program). See Patterson v. New Jersey
Transit Bus Operators, 957 F. Supp. 1391 (1997) (noting that the policy of the defendant provided all employee
who experience alcohol and drug problems with in house assistance programs); see also Romaguera v.
Gegenheimer, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6272 (1996).
268. See Patterson, 957 F. Supp. at 1394 (citing Drug and Alcohol Free Workplace Policy at 27).
269. The Executive Order prescribes the action agencies must take when an employee tests positive for drugs.
Generally, refusal to participate in the EAP will result in dismissal. See 3 C.F.R. 224, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1994).
270. See Patterson, 957 F. Supp. at 1394. Although the regulations required the return to duty testing of an
employee who has tested positive, plaintiffs challenged only the random drug-testing portion of the regulations.
See id.
271. See Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving the retur-to-
duty testing of an employee required to drive a 20,000 pound truck). See also Buckley v. Consolidated Edison of
New York, Inc., 127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997) (involving the drug testing of an employee who was part of an
employee assistance program and was being drug tested randomly every month where other employees were being
tested every five years. The court found that the policy to drug test this employee once every month and other every
five years violated the ADA to the extent that the employee's bladder problem would subject him to termination
for failure to give a urine sample).
272. Mandatory participation may be made available to employees who test positive for drugs in connection
with a pre-employment, routine, post-accident, reasonable suspicion, random or following a return-to-duty
voluntary participation. 3 C.F.R. 224, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
273. One claim that may arise out of return-to-duty testing (if the employee cannot stop using drugs) is a
discrimination claim based on disability.
274. This is also called for-cause testing.
Summer 1998]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
where those individuals were suspected of drug use.275 Reasonable suspicion exists
if the facts and circumstances known warrant rational inferences that the person is
using drugs.276 Courts have recognized that the issue is whether the government
"had sufficient evidence at the time of the compelled urinalysis to support an
objectively reasonable suspicion that the employee used drugs. '277
Courts have allowed warrantless drug testing if the government employer had
"reasonable, articulable grounds '278 to suspect an employee of illegal drug use.279
In other words, to require an employee to undergo drug testing, the employer must
have "individualized suspicion, specifically directed to the person who is targeted
for the urinalysis test. "280
A reasonable search would have to be performed "under circumstances
exhibiting individualized suspicion of on-the-job impairment and with evidence of
substantial reliability."' ' The district court in Bangert v. Hode1282 set forth several
factors that might provide a basis for reasonable suspicion testing, including: (1)
observable phenomena, such as direct observation of an employee engaged in drug-
related activity or exhibiting the physical symptoms of being under the influence of
a drug; (2) a pattern of abnormal conduct or erratic behavior; (3) an arrest or
conviction for a drug-related offense, or the identification of an employee as the
focus of a criminal investigation into illegal drug possession, use or trafficking; (4)
information provided either by reliable or credible sources or independently
corroborated; (5) sudden change in work performance including unexplained or
excessive absenteeism, tardiness or workplace negligence; or (6) evidence that the
employee has tampered with a drug test.2"3
Most cases of reasonable suspicion only involve those employees in positions
"where the impairment of his or her facilities presents a clear and present danger to
the physical safety of the employee, another employee, or a member of the
public. 284 Thus, reasonable suspicion testing has been applied to and upheld as to
police officers because "the lives of the public rest upon [their] alertness."2 5 It has
been applied as to firemen because their insufficient performance is "threatening
275. See D. Garrison "Gary" Hill, Feature, The Needle and the Damage Done: The Fourth Amendment,
Substance Abuse and Drug Testing in the Public Sector, 8-JUN S.C. LAW. 19, 20 (1997).
276. See Ford v. Dowd, 931 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1991).
277. Id. at 1296.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 1289-90. See Jackson v. Gates, 975 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905(1993) (a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment requires an articulable, individualized basis for
suspecting the use of narcotics); See also Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d
Cir. 1989); Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065, 1067 (6th Cir. 1990); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Yeutter. 918 F.2d 968, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1987).
281. Bangert v. Hodel, 705F. Supp. 642,650 (D.D.C. 1989).
282. 705 F. Supp. 642.
283. See id. See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1990);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the criteria for reasonable
suspicion from the Department of Labor, Drug-Free Workplace Plan § 1OA provides similar factors).
284. David A. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward
a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L REV. 201, 217 (1986).
285. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985).
[Vol. 28
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING
[to] the safety of the community."286 The test has been applied to bus drivers
because of the "paramount interest in protecting the public." '287 The test has also
been applied to municipal utility employees "engaged in extremely hazardous
work."' Thus, it may be reasonable to assert that the only employees that may be
tested based on reasonable suspicion are those whose positions are "imbued with
safety considerations." '289 This means that integrity and the objective of enhanced
productivity lacks sufficient importance to permit reasonable suspicion testing.
F. Random Drug Testing
This standard of testing is the most controversial and often depends on the type
of position involved. Under this standard, the employee is chosen by some
"scientifically acceptable manner,"" usually a number chosen by computer and
tested. Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, lower federal
and state courts have disagreed on whether a government agency can impose a
random drug-testing program on its employees absent individualized or reasonable
suspicion.29'
"Random" drug testing has many variables, including: (1) any combination of the
actual collection procedures; (2) notice or forewarning to those to be tested; (3)
randomness in the selection of the tested person; and (4) randomness in the timing
of the testing, such as "unannounced testing." Many courts that have been
confronted with random drug testing have held that individualized suspicion is not
required, especially where the employee's duties and responsibilities can cause
great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to
supervisors.292 Generally, in order for the random testing to be considered
reasonable, the job must be a highly-regulated industry.293 This showing indicates
that the employee has a diminished expectation of privacy.2' In limited circum
286. Everett, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aftfd, 833 F.2d 1507 (11 th Cir. 1987). See also Saavedra
v. Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996).
287. Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1978).
288. Alien v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
289. Miller, supra note 284, at 217-18.
290. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing 53 Fed. Reg. 47,134, 47,137).
291. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that government does not
need to demonstrate that any suspicion at all, in individualized or otherwise, exists to justify a drug-testing program
compelling government employees to urinalysis); Doyon v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 850 F. Supp 125, 128 (D. Conn
1994) (stating that with limited exceptions, government may not require employee to submit to urinalysis absent
a showing of individualized suspicion).
292. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (stating that the
government interest in testing without individualized suspicion is compelling); Transport Workers Union of
Philadelphia Local 234 v. SEPTA, 884 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that the random drug testing program
was constitutionally justified notwithstanding its lack of basis in individualized suspicion). See also Vemonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (court upheld a random drug-testing program for high school athletes
because of the risk that an athlete on drugs can place on other players before the supervisors become aware of the
danger).
293. See Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (police industry is a quasi-military industry and the most heavily regulated in
the state); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (horseracing is a
heavily regulated industry and participants have a diminished expectation of privacy).
294. The relevance of a heavily regulated industry is that it demonstrates that the employees have a
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stances, where primary interests implicated by the search are minimal and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion.295
Within the area of random drug testing, an emerging classification has arisen
called "safety sensitive." '296 Courts have struggled with whether public employees
are properly classified as "safety sensitive"."'
The term "safety sensitive" was unintentionally coined in Skinner in discussing
the non-random testing of railroad employees.298 The Court found these employees
to be engaged in duties "fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences ' 299 and whom "can
cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to
supervisors or others.,'300 This was the only suggestion made for determining
- 301whether a position fell into the classification of "safety sensitive".
In determining whether a job is safety sensitive, one must determine whether
there is an immediate threat posed to the public by an employee whose judgment
and perception is impaired by drug and alcohol abuse. °2 The rationale in Skinner
and Von Raab focused on the immediacy of the threat and where a single
misperformed duty could have irremediable and disastrous consequences, such as
where an employee could not rectify his mistake or other government employees
would have no opportunity to intervene before harm occurs.30 3 Applying this or
similar rationales, courts have decided that police officers,3 °4 firefighters,3 5
diminished privacy expectation. See Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d 133, 140; Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136,
1139; Everett v. Napper, 838 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987) (firefighters considered part of highly regulated industry).
295. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
296. The term "safety sensitive" was conceived in the Skinner decision while analyzing the "special needs"
exception. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
297. See Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering a compelling governmental interest
in determining whether to classify positions in the aviation industry as safety sensitive). See generally Harmon v.
Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (analyzing classification of Department of Justice employees).
298. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
299. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 628).
300. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
301. See id. at 620. The Court stated that it is undisputed that persons handling orders dealing with train
movements, operating crews, and signal maintenance crews and repair of signal systems are engaged in safety-
sensitive tasks. See id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 31,508, 31,511 (1985)).
302. See Kemp v. Claibome County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (citing Skinner, 489
U.S. at 628); see also Regulations from Department of Defense which define employee in a "sensitive position"
as one where the employee has been granted access to classified information, or employees in other positions where
the Contractor determines involve national security, health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of
trust and confidence. Drug-Free Work Force, 48 C.F.R. 252.223.7004 (1996); Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R.
224, 229 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994) (defining a "sensitive position" as any position which is
designated sensitive, critical-sensitive, or non-critical sensitive; any employee who has access to classified
information; any individual who was appointed by the President; any law enforcement officer; and any position
which the head of the agency determines involves law enforcement, national security, public safety or health, or
positions which require a high degree of trust and confidence).
303. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (quoting Skinner, 489
U.S. at 628).
304. See Ford v. Dowd, 931 F.2d 1286 (1991).
305. See Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996).
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emergency medical technicians,' t truck drivers,3 7 railroad workers, 308 scrub
technicians at county hospitals,' and subway signaling maintenance workers310 are
safety sensitive employees who may be randomly tested for drugs.31 t
"Safety sensitive" positions are those whose duties bear "a direct and immediate
impact on public health, safety, or national security." '312 There is ample evidence of
the extraordinary safety sensitivity of the bulk of the covered positions. For
example, mechanics are charged with the duties of repairing large vehicles and are
responsible for driving the repaired vehicles on the streets. This has been found to
directly affect the safety of the vehicle operators and the public.313 A "single drug
related lapse by any covered employee could have irreversible and calamitous
consequences. 314
Blanket testing of government employees is permissible where the position at
issue is one that is "fraught with serious risks of injury to others. '3 5 The question
is what will trigger the random blanket testing of a class of employees. Perhaps
there are a few forms of public employment in which the hazards of even a
momentary lapse of attention of judgment are so substantial in terms of physical
danger to the general public that only this type of testing will suffice.36
306. See id.
307. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991).
308. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Skinner, 934 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991).
309. See Kemp v. Claibome County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (S.D. Miss 1991) (finding that "[t]he
most salient factor in determining the safety sensitivity of a job is the 'immediacy' of the threat posed to the public
by an employee whose judgment and perception is impaired by drug and/or alcohol use") (quoting American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294, 300 (D.D.C. 1990)).
310. See Brown v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 95-9248, 1996 WL601426 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished
opinion).
311. See generally Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,002
(1988) (Department of Transportation regulations required random testing of airline pilots, truck and bus drivers,
merchant seamen, mass transit employees, and natural gas and hazardous liquids pipeline operators). See also Anti-
Drug Program for Personnel Engaged in Specified Aviation Activities, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,024 (1988) (Federal
Aviation Administration); Programs for Chemical Drug and Alcohol Testing of Commercial Vessel Personnel, 53
Fed. Reg. 47,064 (1988) (Coast Guard); Control of Drug Use in Natural Gas, Liquified Natural Gas, and Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,084 (1988) (Research and Special Programs Administration);
Controlled Substances Testing, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,134 (1988) (Fed. Highway Administration); Control of Drug Use
in Mass Transportation Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,156 (1988) (Urban Mass Transportation Administration).
312. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1056 (1990) (urinalysis justified where employees have control or access to dangerous instrumentalities). Examples
of these job categories are: air traffic controller, pilot, aircraft engine mechanic, aircraft overhaul specialist,
propeller and motor mechanic, aircraft mechanic, aircraft servicer, guard, police, criminal investigator, correctional
officer, chemical and nuclear surety positions, direct service staff, and all employees at Army forensic drug testing
laboratories. Id. at 606 n.4.
313. See 19 Solid Waste Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, 1998 WL 244694 *2 (N.M. App.) (citing to the
regulations of the Department of Transportation which require interstate carriers to subject their drivers of vehicles
weighing more than 26,000 pounds to drug testing, 49 C.F.R. § 382.301 (1997)).
314. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 610.
315. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
316. This was the assumption in Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey v. Township of Washington,
850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (upholding the random testing of police officers);
see also Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that the testing of firemen and police officers
without reasonable suspicion is lawful); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990) (upholding the random testing of Department of Transportation
employees, including air traffic controllers, aircraft mechanics, and motor vehicle operators); Thomson v. Marsh,
884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (random testing of employees working with highly lethal chemical warfare agents
is lawful); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 963 (1989) (upholding random
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VI. CONFUSION REMAINING AFTER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS:
WEAKNESSES IN THE DRUG-TESTING ANALYSIS
[Y]ou must remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we work,
ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the
reasons for supporting our predilections."'
With respect to drug testing, the difficulty in determining when it is constitu-
tional is caused by the lack of any clear standards. All of the circumstances under
which employees may be drug tested do have some uncertainty. However, the task
is in predicting how a challenge would result.
A. Pre-employment
The primary questions for any court faced with a question of the constitutionality
of job applicant testing should be: who can be tested and does it matter what type
of position is involved? The cases that address pre-employment testing do not
confront this issue. However, if we include in our search for the more concrete
standards in pre-employment testing a consideration of the various positions
involved, we are guided by more definite criteria. In addition to the positions
involved, we should consider how substantial an interest the parties have in the
testing. For example, there appears to be no justification for the drug testing of a
janitor with no access to any security sensitive information should not be tested
before being hired. The only employees that should be tested at the pre-employment
stage are those who could be subjected to suspicionless testing upon accepting the
position.
However, the law does not direct us to any particular revelation. It merely
suggests that a government employer has much discretion in deciding whether an
applicant or an employee whose position is contingent on the results of the drug test
is hired. This is very disconcerting because there is no reason that a government
should have that much discretion.
The relationship between the unknown history and the diminished expectation
of privacy of the applicant remains the sole defense for allowing such discretion
with pre-employment testing. Thus, the wiser course for the public employer to take
is to perform the testing only after a conditional offer of employment has been
made. However, regardless of the status of the applicant, the government appears
to have the authority to subject that employee to a drug test before he is hired.
testing of police who carry firearms or who participate in drug interdiction); Delaraba v. Nassau County Police
Dep't, 632 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1994) (upholding the random testing of an elite group of police officers engaged
in narcotics enforcement because the daily exposure to drug users and traffickers present enormous and self-evident
risks). But see Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Mass. 1991) (under the state
constitution, random drug testing of police unreasonable where "the record offers nothing to show that there is a
drug problem in the Boston police department").
317. WniIAMO. DouGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975 8 (1980). This is a statement made by former
Chief Justice Charles Hughes to former Justice Douglas.
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B. Post-accident
The decision to test an individual involved in an accident for drug use is based
on sound reasoning that cannot be easily collapsed or damaged. There will
doubtlessly be challenges when those involved in accidents are tested. However,
Skinner protected this circumstance from any significant opposition. The likelihood
that any individual will prevail in a claim seeking to prevent post-accident testing
is slim.
One issue that can arise is whether the testing includes accidents that result in
non-physical damage. What if the damage is to a computer network or a set of files?
What if it results in a loss of a million dollars? Will post-accident testing still apply?
It appears that Skinner only makes provisions for those accidents which involve
or could potentially involve a life. Yet, this issue is one that may arise and which
no court has yet considered. If a policy provides for post-accident testing, it should
at a minimum require drug testing of any employee involved in an accident
involving personal injury or property damage above a specific amount.
C. Routine
Routine drug testing becomes controversial if it involves a drug test taken
without the knowledge of the employee, particularly when the employee is
interested in keeping private certain aspects of their personal lives such as genetic
diseases or pregnancy. However, routine drug testing doesn't appear to have the
same deterrent effect as the other drug testing programs. This is apparent in the
Chandler decision. The Chandler court rejected the idea that addicts might be
unable to abstain from using drugs even if they had the notice and the time to
eliminate detection of drug use from their urine.3"8 Thus, rather than affirming a
testing scheme that could be effective, as did the Von Raab Court, Chandler
invalidated a testing scheme because it was not certain to be effective.3"9
It seems as if routine testing may still be upheld if it is part of physical
examination. It is clear that Chandler narrowed Fourth Amendment analysis for
drug testing cases to the extent that it limited the decision of Von Raab and thus,
affecting the direction of drug testing cases for district courts.
D. Return-to-duty
There is generally no grounds for an employee to challenge return-to-duty drug
testing after the employee has failed a drug test. Most regulations issued by
government employers require drug testing after the employer has tested positive.' 20
In return to duty testing, there is an attempt to balance the employer's interest
with that of the affected employee. The employer's interest is in maintaining a drug-
free workplace. However, both the employee's interest and public policy lie in
318. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320 (1997).
319. See id. at 319-20; see also Brown, supra note 228, at 268.
320. See Drug Tests Required, 49 C.F.R. § 199.11 (1994) (regulations issued by the Research and Special
Programs Administration of the United States Department of Transportation); Control of Drug Use in Mass
Transportation Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,155-77 (1988) (regulations issued by the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration of the Department of Transportation). On the same day, the Coast Guard issued very similar
regulations. See Required Drug Testing, Application, 46 C.F.R. 16.201 (1988).
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preventing discrimination against a person addicted to drugs and who may be
covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).32' However, mandated
drug testing is an area of federal law which has not received much attention
regarding its association with the ADA.322
E. Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion seems to be the emerging ground for which most testing
programs administered by the government are justified. At first glance, the
reasonable suspicion standard is an appealing concept.323 Under this standard, an
employee cannot reasonably expect to avoid being observed on the job. However,
she can expect to avoid the additional scrutiny of body fluid testing unless she gives
her employer reasonable grounds to doubt her abstinence from drug use. Unlike
other tests, the reasonable suspicion test is not an all-purpose test which may be
easily or rationally applied to any employment situation. Even in the context of
government administrative searches, courts have relaxed the suspicion standards,
especially when the government's need for the testing was compelling.324
To say that the reasonable suspicion test offers some degree of protection from
those two intrusions does not mean that it offers the best protection. On one hand,
the reasonable suspicion test will permit testing when less intrusive measures would
adequately protect the employer's interest.325 An employee may be validly suspected
of drug use only when her employer or co-worker observes her intoxicated,
performing poorly, or selling or buying drugs at work.326 This may even involve
irrational behavior.327 It is unclear why the employer, at this point, should find it
necessary to administer a drug test. It is more natural for the employer to ask the
employee to explain why he appears to be intoxicated or why he has not been
meeting some performance expectation. An employee unwilling to plausibly explain
321. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29, 42 & 47 U.S.C.).
322. See David LaPorte, Comment, The Conflict and Interaction of the Americans with Disabilities Act with
the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act: Two Modest Proposals to Achieve Greater Synchrony, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 537, 537 (1996).
323. Since reasonable suspicion testing depends solely on what the employer observes, it gives employers
much latitude on who to drug test, when and how often employees can be drug tested.
324. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (public employee's privacy interest in contents of
work desk is outweighed by governmental interest in efficient operation of workplace).
325. For example, an employer can simply ask an employee whether he is feeling airight or whether s/he has
taken any drugs.
326. But see Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620 (10th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Circuit rejected
the contention that "such testing must be based only on direct observation and/or physical evidence that the
employee's ability to perform his job is under the influence of a drug." Id. at 624. It then found that there was a
need for sufficient "information which would lead a reasonable person to suspect non-safety-sensitive employees
... of on-the-job drug use, possession or impairment." Id. What is curious about classifying a position as safety
sensitive but not upholding the just cause drug testing is that the "special needs" exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements generally permits drug testing of employees in safety sensitive positions, pursuant to
a random selection process, and does not require reasonable suspicion that an employee might be impaired.
327. See Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 1997) (involving a physician who slapped a patient and was
dismissed after refusing to undergo a drug test).
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or improve her performance could be dismissed for 'just cause. 3 28 But this is
dangerous if the employer has no personal knowledge or concrete evidence of the
employee's diminished work performance or on-the-job intoxication.329
On the other hand, the reasonable suspicion standard might overprotect the
employee's privacy interest. An employee may be impaired without showing signs
of impairment.3" Because a reasonable suspicion standard would not permit testing
below the threshold of human observation, it may keep employers from discovering
a human reliability problem in very dangerous settings until after it is too late.
Finally, reasonable suspicion is unlikely to prove a practical and easily
administered standard. What constitutes reasonable suspicion is often a very fact-
specific inquiry.331 Therefore, employers may lack bright-line standards to test with
confidence, knowing that they are within the law. Furthermore, as safety concerns
become more important, a random, but not arbitrary or indiscriminate, testing
scheme may make more sense. As safety concerns decline in importance, the
employer seeking to guard against other problems, such as absenteeism, poor
performance, or theft, by testing, can also do so by using less intrusive means.332 A
reasonable suspicion standard has value because it prevents employers from
arbitrarily testing any employee and permits employees to rebut false, but
nevertheless reasonable suspicions of drug use. However, the standard is too
inflexible for use across the range of employment situations and, consequently,
often overprotects or underprotects the employee's privacy.
F. Random
Random drug testing and reasonable suspicion testing are the two most
controversial circumstances under which an employee has been subjected to drug
testing. The application of safety sensitive and the "special needs" doctrine in drug
testing cases has not led to uniformity in analysis. Courts have applied the safety
sensitive and the "special needs" doctrine believing that consistent application of
these factors would lead to consistent results. However, the opposite has occurred.
After four Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutional analysis of drug-
testing programs, it appears that the federal courts are more confused about who
may be classified as "safety sensitive" and thus, subject to random drug testing.333
328. See id. at 870. This is assuming the employer has conscientiously documented the employee's poor
performance at work. Serious care should be taken not to rely on "hearsay" type information. See Hill, supra note
275, at 20.
329. See Roberts v. City of Newport News, 36 F.3d 1093 (unpublished disposition), No. 93-2327, 1997 WL
520948 (4th Cir., Sept. 23, 1994) (finding that the city had violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting for-
cause testing on a fire department emergency medical technician based solely on two telephone calls from another
employee's spouse who never actually observed the supposed illegal drug use).
330. For example, regular users of drugs may be able to mask their use very easily.
331. Often, reasonable suspicion depends on the employer. A more experienced employer might be able to
catch a drug abuser more quickly and more efficiently than an inexperienced employer.
332. An employer may simply decide to fire an employee after several warnings so long as the position does
not involve public safety.
333. See generally Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (analyzing classification of
Department of Justice employees); Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6272 (E.D. La. May 3,
1996) (discussing the classification of employees of clerk of court's offices).
Although courts have confused what constitutes "safety sensitive" or what falls under the "special needs"
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The only issue on which all courts agree is that any type of drug testing constitutes
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.334
What creates such confusion and discord among the courts is that there is no
clear test except where it is indisputable that the position involved has an effect on
public safety. The "safety sensitive" criteria as well as the "special needs" exception
has caused chaos among the courts.335 For example, in Rutherford v. City of
Albuquerque,336 the Tenth Circuit concluded that although driving a 26,000 pound
truck is properly designated as a "safety sensitive" position, the testing of an
employee returning to work is an unreasonable search. However, rather than
concentrating on the privacy interest at stake and the expectation of privacy, the
courts have emphasized the policy rationale behind the drug testing programs.
337
Random drug testing appears to be the most effective deterrent to drug use.338
When conducted without notice or probable cause, random testing can ensure
compliance with regulations against drug use.3 9 This is particularly important
where drug abusers cannot be easily identified.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although some individuals may be skeptical of public employee drug testing for
philosophical reasons, the practice appears to rest on firm legal basis. The Supreme
Court decisions seem to cover much ground in the analysis of the issue of drug
testing, however, there are still some areas that are left unclear. Among the areas
needed to be clarified are: (1) what determines a position which has a diminished
expectation of privacy; (2) whether deterrence is sufficient as an objective for drug
testing; and (3) what constitutes a safety sensitive position.
Initially, when this author first began examining this issue, she objected to the
notion that the Supreme Court could determine that some employees' privacy rights
were more "legitimate" or "reasonable" than others. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court seemed to waver on its criteria, particularly with respect to the Chandler
decision. However, after researching the issue of public employee drug testing, this
author's perspective has changed from one of outright objection to one of reluctant
acceptance.
In the long term, this author is almost certain that subjecting public employees
to testing will provide or promote a safer environment for the public, particularly
because it appears that some form of drug testing is one of the most effective ways
exception, there are certain positions for which there is undoubtedly a legitimate reason to test randomly. These
positions most often involve police officers, firefighters, pilots, train conductors and bus drivers.
334. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,620 (1989) (stating that the Fed. Courts
of Appeals have concluded unanimously that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment). See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1996); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
335. See Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Benavidez
v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620, 624 (10th Cir. 1996).
336. 77 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 1996)
337. See Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714,718 (Tenn. 1997). See also Jackson, supra note 108,
at 694-95.
338. See R. Scott McClain, Comment, The Expanding Spectrum of Permissible Public Employee Drug
Testing, 1990 DET. C. L. REv 727, 765 (1990).
339. Id.
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to prevent drug abuse among employees. The balancing test provided by the
Supreme Court appears 340 to promote such an interest. However, achieving success
of such a goal actually depends less on the ability to win courtroom legal battles and
more on educating the public, including public employees, on the potential dangers
of drug use. The proper forum for such an issue should not be in the courtroom, but
in schools and employment training classes.
The Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the
individual and society depends on the recognition of the "right to be let alone"
which is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by the citizens
of the United States." As noted by Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect our liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in invidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.' z
For positions where drug use does not pose a risk to the public, the right of those
public employees to be let alone and free from the intrusion of drug testing should
be protected. Certainly, the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in
times of crisis and surely, there is a drug crisis in America. However, we must
always remain firm in the idea that the government will not respond hysterically
when there is a crisis. Certainly when the crises are real, the government may justify
an intrusion. However, it should never broadly sweep the rights of groups of people
together.
There is one enduring lesson in the long struggle to protect individual rights and
society's need to defend itself against lawlessness. The lesson is that
it is easy to make light of insistence or scrupulous regard for the safeguards of
civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History
bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
needlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end. 43
JILL DORANCY-WILLIAMS
340. In a 1995 Gallup survey, when asked to describe the prevalence of drug problems in the workplace, most
of the respondents said that they felt the problems had either increased or stayed the same. Thirty-seven percent
of all respondents said they felt that problems with drugs had increased over the past five years. Thirty-eight percent
felt that it had remained the same. See Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace, Gallup Survey,
<httpJ/www.drugfreeworkplace.org.> (visited June 23, 1998).
Some surveys show that there has been a decrease in drug test "positive" rate in 1996. See SmithKline Beecham
Drug Testing Index (stating that of more than four million tests which were conducted in 1995, nearly 232,000 were
"positive"). Further, the same source reveals that positive rates for safety-sensitive transportation workers increased
for "pre-employment" (4.1% to 4.3%), "for cause/reasonable suspicion" (10.8% to 11%) and return to duty (3.7%
to 3.8%). See id.
341. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
343. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946).
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